European Central BankReaders of The Economist will already be familar with the name Bagehot, it being the title for their UK-focused regular column. I suspect fewer will have read anything by the man after whom it is named.

I recently had cause to browse Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market (a free online copy can be found at Project Gutenberg). Written in 1873, in the aftermath of a banking crisis (Lombard Street is in the City of London, and used in this context to refer to the global banking system), it’s a remarkably prescient view of our current situation, and one worth citing from directly. I will not provide much further commentary as his quoted words are self-explanatory both in their description of the problem and the least-worst solution. I’ve also kept any modifications to the absolute minimum required to retain comprehension on stitching the quotes together.

The briefest and truest way of describing Lombard Street is to say that it is by far the greatest combination of economical power and economical delicacy that the world has even seen. Of the greatness of the power there will be no doubt. Money is economical power. But very few persons are aware how much greater than the ready balance is the floating loan-fund which can be lent to anyone or for any purpose.

A million in the hands of a single banker is a great power; he can at once lend it where he will, and borrowers can come to him, because they know or believe that he has it. But the same sum scattered in tens and fifties through a whole nation is no power at all: no one knows where to find it or whom to ask for it. Concentration of money in banks, though not the sole cause, is the principal cause which has made the Money Market so exceedingly rich.

It is a luxury which has never been enjoyed with even comparable equality before.

But in exact proportion to the power of this system is its delicacy. Only our familiarity blinds us to the marvellous nature of the system. There never was so much borrowed money collected in the world. If any large fraction of that money really was demanded, our banking system and our industrial system too would be in great danger. The amount of cash-in-hand is so exceedingly small that a bystander almost trembles when he compares its minuteness with the immensity of the credit which rests upon it.

We do not always manage it with discretion. There is the astounding instance of Overend, Gurney, and Co. to the contrary. Ten years ago that house stood next to the Bank of England in the City of London; it was better known abroad than any similar firm known, perhaps, better than any purely English firm. The partners had great estates, which had mostly been made in the business. They still derived an immense income from it. Yet in six years they lost all their own wealth, sold the business to the company, and then lost a large part of the company’s capital. And these losses were made in a manner so reckless and so foolish, that one would think a child who had lent money in the City of London would have lent it better. After this example, we must not confide too surely in long-established credit, or in firmly-rooted traditions of business. We must examine the system on which these great masses of money are manipulated, and assure ourselves that it is safe and right.

Ordinarily discredit does not at first settle on any particular bank, still less does it at first concentrate itself on the bank or banks holding the principal cash reserve. These banks are almost sure to be those in best credit, or they would not be in that position, and, having the reserve, they are likely to look stronger and seem stronger than any others. At first, incipient panic amounts to a kind of vague conversation: Is A. B. as good as he used to be? Has not C. D. lost money? and a thousand such questions. And every day, as a panic grows, this floating suspicion becomes both more intense and more diffused; it attacks more persons; and attacks them all more virulently than at first. All men of experience, therefore, try to strengthen themselves in the early stage of a panic [by limiting credit].

A panic, in a word, is a species of neuralgia; you must not starve it. The holders of the cash reserve must be ready not only to keep it for their own liabilities, but to advance it most freely for the liabilities of others. They must lend to merchants, to minor bankers, to ‘this man and that man,’ whenever the security is good. In wild periods of alarm, one failure makes many, and the best way to prevent the derivative failures is to arrest the primary failure which causes them.

There should be a clear understanding between the Central Bank and the public that, since the Bank hold out ultimate banking reserve, they will recognise and act on the obligations which this implies; that they will replenish it in times of foreign demand as fully, and lend it in times of internal panic as freely and readily, as plain principles of banking require.

We should also look at the rest of our banking system and try to reduce the demands on the Bank as much as we can. The central machinery being inevitably frail, we should carefully and as much as possible diminish the strain upon it.

It may be said that the reserve in the central bank will not be enough for all such loans. If that be so, it must fail. But lending is, nevertheless, its best expedient. This is the method of making its money go the farthest, and of enabling it to get through the panic if anything will so enable it. Making no loans as we have seen will ruin the country; making large loans and stopping, as we have also seen, will ruin it. The only safe plan for the Bank is the brave plan, to lend in a panic on every kind of current security, or every sort on which money is ordinarily and usually lent. This policy may not save the Bank [and the country]; but if it do not, nothing will save it.

Bagehot went on to describe the importance of central bank lending at a premium to the pre-crisis rate & to lend against collateral, both to ensure moral hazard remained. The US Federal Reserve, The Bank of England, the Bank of Japan and even China’s central bank have all read & understood Bagehot and turned on the money tap to keep the global system from seizing up entirely and so utterly destroying the quality of life of billions of people. The European Central Bank likely also understands it, given its participation in the 30th November 2011 central bank agreement to increase dollar liquidity. Unfortunately, it is currently prevented from acting further due the legal limitations placed on it by, primarily, the Germans in terms of using one of a central bank’s greatest assets: printing money to permit that liquidity flow and devalue currency, even at the cost of inflation.

As we begin to see the cautious outlines of a potential “grand bargain” on lending involving the IMF, the world’s major central banks, the BRICS, and Eurozone fiscal policy union, let’s hope they haven’t left it too late…